

Alija IZETBEGOVIC
President of the Presidency of Bosnia and Hercegovina

THE ISLAMIC DECLARATION

A Programme for the Islamization of Muslims and the Muslim Peoples

Sarajevo, 1990

THE ISLAMIC DECLARATION

A PROGRAMME FOR THE ISLAMIZATION OF MUSLIMS

AND THE MUSLIM PEOPLES

OUR GOAL: The Islamization of Muslims

OUR MOTTO: Believe and struggle

BISMILLAHIRAHMANIRRAHIM!

The Declaration which we today present to the public is not prescribed reading, intended to demonstrate to foreigners or doubters the superiority of Islam over any particular system or school of thought.

It is intended for Muslims who know where they belong and whose hearts clearly tell them which side they stand on. For such as these, this Declaration is a call to understand the inevitable consequences of that to which their love and allegiance bind them.

The entire Muslim world is in a state of ferment and change. Whatever whatever form it eventually takes when the initial effects of these changes is felt, one thing is certain: it will no longer be the world of the first half of this century. The age of passivity and stagnation has gone forever.

Everyone is trying to make take advantage of this time of movement and change, particularly foreign powers, both East and West. Instead of their armies, they now use ideas and capital, and by a new mode of influence are once more endeavouring to accomplish the same aim: to ensure their presence and keep the Muslim nations in a state of spiritual helplessness and material and political dependence.

China, Russia and the Western countries quarrel as to who among them will extend patronage and to which part of the Muslim

world. Theirs is a pointless dispute. The Islamic world does not
oppose them, but is the Muslim peoples.

A world of 700 million people with enormous natural resources, occupying a first class geographical position, heir to colossal cultural and political traditions and the proponent of living Islamic thought, cannot long remain in a state of vassalage. There is no power which can check the new Muslim generation from putting an end to this abnormal state of affairs.

In this conviction, we announce to our friends and enemies alike that Muslims are determined to take the fate of the Islamic world into their own hands and arrange that world according to their own vision of it.

From this point of view, the ideas contained in the Declaration are not absolutely new. This is rather a synthesis of ideas heard with increasing frequency in various places and which are accorded about the same importance in all parts of the Muslim world. Its novelty lies in that it seeks to promote ideas and plans into organized action.

The struggle towards new goals did not begin today. On the contrary, it has already experienced *shihada** and its history contains pages of the suffering of its victims. Still, this is mainly the personal sacrifice of exceptional individuals or courageous minor groups in collision with the mighty forces of the *Jahiliya**. The magnitude of the problem and its difficulties, however, required the organized action of millions.

**shihada*: martyrdom. *Jahiliya*: the godless. Period of darkness prior to Islam. (Translator's note).

Our message is dedicated to the memory of our comrades who have fallen in the name of Islam.

Sarajevo, 1970
Jumadi-l-awwal, 1390

Do we want the Muslim peoples to break out of the circle of dependence, backwardness and poverty?

Do we want them to step out confidently once more on the road to dignity and enlightenment, to become the masters of their own destiny?

Do we want burning courage, genius and virtue to burst forth again in all their force?

Then we can clearly show the way which leads to this goal:

The generating of Islam in all areas of personal individual life, in the family and society, through the renewal of Islamic religious thought and the creation of a united Islamic community from Morocco to Indonesia.

This goal may seem remote and improbable, but it is nonetheless realistic, because it is the only one located within the bounds of possibility. In contrast, every non-Islamic programme may seem to be close and within range of its target, but for the Islamic world this is pure utopia, because these programmes lie in the realm of the impossible.

History demonstrates one fact clearly: Islam is the single idea which has been able to excite the imagination of the Muslim peoples and to instil in them the necessary measure of

discipline, inspiration and energy. No other ideal, foreign to Islam, has ever managed to hold sway in any meaningful way either in the culture or at state level. In fact, all that is great or noteworthy in the history of the Muslim peoples has been done under the banner of Islam. A few thousand tried warriors of Islam forced Britain to withdraw from Suez in the 1950s, while the combined armies of the Arab nationalist regimes are now for the third time losing the battle against Israel. Turkey as an Islamic country ruled the world. Turkey as a plagiarist of Europe is now a third-rate country, like a hundred others throughout the world.

Just like an individual, a people that has accepted Islam is thereafter incapable of living and dying for any other ideal. It is unthinkable that a Muslim should sacrifice himself for any king or ruler, no matter who he might be, or for the glory of any nation or party, because the strongest Islamic instinct recognizes in this a kind of paganism and idolatry. A Muslim can die only in the name of Allah and for the glory of Islam, or flee the battlefield.

Periods of passivity and stagnation in fact mean the absence of an Islamic alternative or unreadiness on the part of the Muslim population to take the uphill path. They are the negative expression of the spiritual monopoly which Islam holds over the Islamic world.

While accepting this situation as an expression of the Will of God, we positively state that the Islamic world cannot be renewed without Islam or against it. Islam and its deep-rooted

precepts on man's place in the world, the purpose of human life, the relationship between God and man and between man and man, remains a lasting and irreplaceable ethical, philosophical, ideological and political foundation for every authentic action taken towards renewal and improvement of the state of the Muslim peoples.

The alternative is stark: either a move towards Islamic renewal, or passivity and stagnation. For the Muslim peoples, there is no third possibility.

I THE BACKWARDNESS OF THE MUSLIM PEOPLES

CONSERVATIVES AND MODERNISTS

The idea of Islamic renewal, which understands Islam as capable not only of educating human beings but also of ordering the world, will always have two types of people as its opponents: conservatives who want the old forms, and modernists who want someone else's forms. The former drag Islam back into the past, the latter push it towards an alien future.

Despite differences, both categories of people have something in common: both see Islam only as a religion, in the European sense of the word. A certain lack of feeling for the finesses of language and logic, and an even greater failure to grasp the essence of Islam and its role in history and the world, lead them to interpret Islamic belief as religion, which for a very special reason is quite erroneous.

Although it may seem a reconfirmation of the fundamental truths on the origin of man and his mission, the Islamic approach is quite new in one aspect - that of its demand for the conjunction of faith and knowledge, morals and politics, ideals and interests. By recognizing the existence of two worlds, the natural and the interior, Islam teaches that it is man who bridges the chasm between them. Without this oneness, religion tends towards backwardness (the rejection of any kind of productive

life), and knowledge towards atheism.

Starting from the viewpoint that Islam is merely a religion, conservatives will conclude that Islam should not, and progressives that it cannot, organize the external world. The practical result is the same.

The main, if not the only, proponent of the conservative idea in the Muslim world today is the class represented by the *hajjs* and *sheikhs* who, in contrast to clear dictates on the nonexistence of a clergy in Islam, have emerged as an organized class which has preempted the interpretation of Islam and set itself up as an intermediary between man and the Qu'ran. As clergy, they are theologians; as theologians, they are invariably dogmatic and, as the faith has been given once and for all, in their opinion it has also been interpreted once and for all. Therefore the best thing to do is to leave everything as it was handed down and defined a thousand or more years ago. The unavoidable logic of these dogmatists turns theologians into bitter enemies of anything new. Any further remodelling of the Sharia as law, in the sense of applying Qu'ranic principles to new situations which continue to emerge from world developments, is equated with an attack on the integrity of the faith. Perhaps even here there is a love of Islam, but it is the pathological love of narrowminded and backward people, whose deathlike embrace has strangled the still living Islamic idea.

It would, however, be wrong to think that Islam has remained a closed book in the hands of the theologians. Increasingly

closed to knowledge and ever more open to mysticism, theologists have allowed much that is irrational to be written in this book, things totally foreign to Islamic learning, including sheer superstition. It will be immediately evident to anyone who knows the nature of theology why it has been unable to withstand the temptation of mythology, and why it has seen even in this a certain enrichment of religious thought. The monotheism of the Qu'ran, the purest and most perfect in the history of religious learning, has been gradually compromised, while in practice a distasteful trade in belief has emerged. Those who call themselves interpreters and guardians of the faith have made a career of it - a very agreeable and profitable one - and without many qualms of conscience have come to accept a state of affairs in which its messages have not been implemented at all.

Theologians have turned out to be the wrong people in the wrong place. Now, when the Muslim world is giving all signs of an awakening, this class has become the expression of all that is gloomy and sclerotic in that world. It has shown itself to be quite incapable of taking any kind of constructive step towards making the Islamic world face up to the adversities which press upon it.

As far as the so-called progressives, westerners, modernists and whatever else they are called are concerned, they are the exemplification of real misfortune throughout the Muslim world, as they are quite numerous and influential, notably in government, education and public life. Seeing the *hajjs* and conservatives

conservatives as the personification of Islam, and convincing others to do likewise, the modernists raise a front against all that the idea represents. These self-styled reformers in the present-day Muslim countries may be recognized by their pride in what they should rather be ashamed of, and their shame in what they should be proud of. These are usually "daddy's sons", schooled in Europe, from which they return with a deep sense of their own inferiority towards the wealthy West and a personal superiority over the poverty-stricken and backward surroundings from which they spring. Lacking an Islamic upbringing and or any spiritual or moral links with the people, they quickly lose their elementary criteria and imagine that by destroying local ideas, customs and convictions, while introducing alien ones, they will build America - for which they have an exaggerated admiration - overnight on their home soil. Instead of standards, they introduce the cult of a standard; instead of developing the potential of their own world, they develop desires, thus opening the way to corruption, primitivism and moral chaos. They cannot see that the power of the Western world does not lie in how it lives, but in how it works; that its strength is not in fashion, godlessness, night clubs, a younger generation out of control, but in the extraordinary diligence, persistence, knowledge and responsibility of its people.

The main problem, therefore, is not that our westerners used alien forms, but that they did not know how to use them, or - to put it better - that they did not have a sufficiently developed

sense of what was right. They failed to choose the useful product and took over instead the harmful, suffocating byproduct of another civilization.

Among the props of doubtful value which our westerner takes home with him are to be found various "revolutionary" ideas, reform programmes and similar "rescue doctrines" which will "solve all problems". Among these "reforms" are examples of unbelievable shortsightedness and improvization.

Thus, for example, Mustafa Kemal Attaturk, who was obviously a greater military leader than a cultural reformer and whose services to Turkey should be reduced to their proper measure, in one of his reforms prohibited the wearing of the fez. It soon became evident that changing the shape of their caps cannot change what is in people's heads or habits.

Many nations outside the Western sphere have been facing the problem of how to relate to this civilization for over a century: whether to opt for outright rejection, cautious adjustment or total unselective acceptance. The tragedy or triumph of many of them has hung on how they have responded to this fateful question.

There are reforms which reflect the wisdom of a particular nation and others which signify betrayal of itself. The examples of Japan and Turkey are classics of modern history in this respect.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both countries provided a picture of very similar "comparable" countries. Both were ancient empires, each with its own

physiognomy and place in history. Both found themselves at approximately the same level of development; both had a glorious past, which indicated both great privilege and a heavy burden. In a word, their chances for the future were about equal.

Then followed the well-known reforms in both countries. In order to continue to live in its own way and not in another, Japan tried to unite tradition and progress. Turkey's modernists chose the opposite path. Today, Turkey is a third-rate country, while Japan has climbed to a pinnacle among the nations of the world.

The difference in the philosophy of Japanese and Turkish reformers is nowhere more evident than in the question of the alphabet.

While Turkey abolished Arabic writing, which because of its simplicity and just twenty-eight characters is one of the most perfect and widespread of alphabets, Japan rejected demands by its *Romaya* to introduce the Roman script. It retained its complicated system which subsequent to the reforms, contained 880 Chinese ideograms in addition to 46 characters. No one is illiterate in modern-day Japan, while in Turkey - forty years after the introduction of Roman letters - over half the population cannot read or write, a result which should cause the blind to regain their sight.

And that is not all. It soon became evident that what was at issue was not simply the alphabet as a means of register. The true reasons, and thus the consequences, were much deeper and more significant. The essence of all human civilization and progress

...continuation, not in destruction and negation. Its way of writing is the way in which the nation "remembers" and endures in history. By abolishing the Arabic alphabet, all the wealth of the past, preserved in the written word, was largely lost to Turkey, and by this single act the country was levelled to the brink of barbarianism. With a series of other "parallel" reforms, the new Turkish generation found itself with no spiritual prop, in a kind of spiritual vacuum. Turkey had lost the remembrance of its past. Whom did this profit?

The supporters of modernism in the Islamic world, then, were not wise men who sprang from the people, who would know how to implement in a novel way the old ideals and values under changed circumstances. They rose up against the values themselves and often with icy cynicism and astounding shortsightedness, trampled on what the people held sacred, destroying life and transplanting an imitation in its stead. As a consequence of such barbarity in Turkey and elsewhere, plagiarist nations emerged, or are in process of emerging: countries where spiritual confusion reigns, featureless and with no sense of where they are going. Everything in them is derivative and artificial, lacking in force and enthusiasm, like the false glamour of their Europeanized cities.

Can a country unsure of its identity, of where its roots lie, have a clear picture of where it is bound or what it should be striving for?

The example of some of Attaturk's reforms may seem drastic. At the same time, they represent a pattern for the western

approach to problems of the Islamic world and the way in which westerners think to "correct" it. This invariably means alienation, fleeing from real problems, from painstaking work on the true moral and educational elevation of the people, an orientation towards the external and the superficial.

What was meant by the independence of a Muslim country in which the administration of public life fell into the hands of this type of person? How did they make use of that freedom?

By accepting foreign modes of thought and by seeking political support from foreigners, whether East or West, each of these countries voluntarily, through the mouths of their new administrators, acquiesced to re-enslavement. A spiritual and material independence was created, embracing an alien philosophy, an alien way of life, alien aid, alien capital and alien support. These countries formally achieved independence, but they did not achieve real freedom, since freedom of any kind is primarily spiritual. The independence of a people which has not first won this is soon reduced to an anthem and a flag, two very minor factors for true independence.

The struggle for true independence of the Muslim peoples, then, must begin anew everywhere.

THE ROOTS OF HELPLESSNESS

These two types - conservatives and modernists - provide the key to understanding the current state of the Muslim peoples.

However, they are not the only cause of this state. Taken further, both facets are the manifestation of a deeper cause: the degradation or rejection of Islamic thought.

The history of Islam is not only, or even mainly, the history of a progressive affirmation of Islam in real life. It is just as much a story of incomprehension, neglect, betrayal and abuse of this idea. Thus the history of each and every Muslim people is simultaneously a chronology of brilliant achievements and victories, of grievous mistakes and defeat. All our successes and failures, political and moral, are only the reflection of our acceptance of Islam and how we have applied it to life. A weakening in the influence of Islam on the practical life of the people has always been accompanied by their degradation and that of social and political institutions.

The entire history of Islam, from its first beginnings to our day, unfolded under the inexorable influence of this coincidence. Something of the unalterable fate of the Muslim peoples and one of the laws of Islamic history is to be found in this parallel.

Two characteristic moments in Islamic history - one from the age of its ascendancy, one from the age of decadence - very clearly illustrate this effect.

Muhammad (peace be upon him) died in 632 A.D. Less than a hundred years later, the spiritual and political power of Islam extended over a huge area, from the Atlantic Ocean to the river Indus and to China, from Lake Aral to the lower reaches of the Nile. Syria was conquered in 634, Damascus fell in 635, Ctesiphon

in 637. India and Egypt were reached in 641. Carthage in 647. Samarkand in 676. Spain in 710. Muslims were at the gates of Constantinople in 717, and in 720 in southern France. There were mosques in Shantung by 700 and about 830. Islam arrived in Java.

This unique expansion, to which no other can be compared before or since, provided a space for the development of Islamic civilization in three spheres of culture: Spain, the Middle East and India, a period of history covering about one thousand years.

What do Muslims mean in the contemporary world?

The question could be phrased another way: how far are we Muslim?

The answers to these questions are linked.

We are enslaved: at one point in 1919, no single independent Muslim country existed, a state of affairs never registered either before or after that date.

We are uneducated: in the period between two world wars, no Muslim country had a literacy rate of over 50 per cent. At independence, 75 per cent of the people of Pakistan, 80 per cent of Algerians and 90 per cent of Nigerians could neither read nor write. (In contrast, no one in Islamic Spain of the tenth and eleventh centuries, according to Draper, was illiterate.)

We are poor: gross national income per capita in 1966 in Iran was 220 dollars, in Turkey 240, in Malasia 250, in Pakistan 90, in Afghanistan 85, in Indonesia 70, as against 3000 in the USA. The share of industry in the national income of most Muslim countries varies between 10 and 20 per cent. The number of calories in the

daily diet is an average 2000, compared to 3000-3500 in Western Europe.

We are a divided community: instead of a society without either misery or luxury. Muslim society has turned into the opposite. In contradiction to the Qu'ranic command "...that this wealth should not remain within the circle of the rich among you" (Qu'ran 39/7), property gradually passed into the hands of a small number. Prior to agrarian reform in Iraq in 1958, out of 22 million *dunum** of arable land, about 18 million *dunum* (82 per cent) were held by the great landowners. Meanwhile, 1.4 million peasants had no land at all.

This was the state of affairs which some have called with reason "the night of Islam". In fact, that night began with the twilight of our hearts. All that has happened to us or is happening to us today, is only the echo and repetition of what has previously happened within ourselves (Qu'ran, 13/12).

We as Muslims cannot be subjugated, uneducated, estranged from one another. We cannot be renegades from Islam. All our defeats, from the first at Uhud to the latest on Sinai, confirm this.

The phenomenon of the abandonment of Islam, most frequently seen in the suppression of Islamic thought from active and vigilant life and its reduction to transience and passivity, can be most clearly observed by taking the Qu'ran, the central truth of Islamic ideology and practice.

**dunum*: about one-tenth of a hectare (translator's note)

It should be remarked that every advance of the Islamic peoples, every age of refinement, began with the affirmation of the Qu'ran. The expansion of early Islam, whose miraculous course I have already mentioned and which in the course of two generations brought it to the shores of the Atlantic Ocean in the West and to the outer reaches of China in the East, is not the only, but is the most glorious example. All major swings in the course of Islamic history confirm this parallel.

What was the position of the Qu'ran at the time preceding the age of stagnation and retreat?

Devotion to the Book did not cease, but it lost its active character while retaining what was irrational and mystic. The Qu'ran lost its authority as law while gaining in sanctity as an object. In study and interpretation, wisdom yielded to hair-splitting, essence to form and grandeur of thought to the skill of recitation. Under the constant influence of theological formalism, the Qu'ran was read less and "learned" (recited) more, while commandments on struggle, uprightness, personal and material sacrifice - harsh and repellant to our inertia - dissolved and vanished in the pleasant sound of the Qu'ranic text learnt off by heart. This unnatural state of affairs came to be accepted as the norm, because it suited an ever more numerous group of Muslims who could neither break with the Qu'ran nor summon the strength to order their lives according to its dictates.

The psychological explanation of the exaggerated importance given to recital of the Qu'ran may be found in this fact. The Qu'ran is recited, interpreted and recited, then studied and

recited again. One sentence is repeated thousands of times in order not to have to apply it once. An extensive and pedantic science has been established on how the Qu'ran should be pronounced so as to avoid the issue of how to practice it in daily life. Ultimately, the Qu'ran has been turned into naked sound without visible sense or meaning.

All the reality of the Muslim world, with its discrepancy between word and deed; its debauchery, dirt, injustice and cowardice; its monumental, empty mosques; its great white turbans, devoid of ideals or courage; its hypocritical Islamic catchphrases and religious posing; this faith without belief is but the external reflection of the fundamental contradiction in which the Qu'ran found itself, in which burning allegiance to the Book was gradually combined with total neglect of its principles in practice.

The situation of the Qu'ran is the first and most important cause of backwardness and helplessness among the Muslim peoples. Another cause of universal importance is education, or rather the system of upbringing in the broadest sense.

For centuries now our peoples have been deprived of educated people. Instead, they have two other types, equally undesirable: the uneducated and the wrongly educated. In no Muslim country do we have a system of education sufficiently developed and thus capable of responding to the moral understanding of Islam and the needs of the people. Our rulers either neglected this most sensitive institution of any society, or left it up to strangers.

The schools to which foreigners donated money and personnel, and thereby curricula and ideology, did not educate Muslims, not even nationalists. In them, our budding intellectuals were injected with the "virtues" of obedience, submission and admiration for the might and wealth of the foreigner; in them foreign tutors fostered a vassal mentality in the intelligentsia, which would in the future replace them with extraordinary success, because the latter would feel themselves to be foreigners in their own country and behave accordingly. It would be most informative to discover the number of schools and colleges which are held, directly or indirectly, by foreigners, and to reflect on the reasons for this extraordinary generosity. The curricula of these institutions should be gone into in depth and examined for content, perhaps even more so for what they fail to contain. It would soon be clear that the real question is not whether our intelligentsia wishes to find a path to its people, to their real inclinations and interests, but whether, constituted as it is, it can find that path at all. What is at stake are the values and ideals which have been imposed on it, and the psychological gap which has been created. Iron chains are no longer necessary to keep our peoples in submission. The silken cords of this alien "education" have the same power, paralyzing the minds and will of the educated. While education is so conceived, foreign wielders of power and their vassals in Muslim countries need have no fear for their positions. Instead of being a source of rebellion and resistance, this system of education is their best ally.

this system of education is their best ally.

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The tragic gap between the intelligentsia and the people, which is one of the darkest features of our overall position, is re-entrenched from the other side. Sensing the alien and non-Islamic character of the schools on offer, the people instinctively reject them, so that the estrangement becomes mutual. Absurd accusations are constructed as to the disinclination of Muslim environments towards school and education. In fact, it is clear that this is not a question of rejecting schools as such, but of rejecting alien schools, which have lost every spiritual link with Islam and the people.

INDIFFERENCE OF THE MUSLIM MASSES

The about-turn effected by modernists in a series of Muslim countries was, almost as a rule, anti-religious and led by slogans on the de-clericalization of political and social life. From this aspect it is reminiscent of the struggle between the awakening national states and the church in Europe on the threshold of the Modern Age. But what meant progress and constitutionality for the West, represented an unnatural process in the Islamic world, one which was incapable of effecting constructive change. Declericalization and nationalism had no positive aspects here, and were in fact merely a negation. Foreign in origin and matter, they were the reflection of a pervasive spiritual sterility. With them, the curtain rose on the last act in the drama of the Muslim world. From the situation which ensued, this act could be called: "a dual

Every renaissance occurs as the result of creative contact, affinity or internal concord between the thinking and leading elements in a society on the one hand, and the populace at large on the other. The leading group represents will and thought, the people the heart and blood of any great undertaking. Without the cooperation or at least consent of the ordinary man, all action remains superficial, lacking in strike force. The sluggishness of the masses can be overcome if it is merely the consequence of a natural resistance to hard work, danger and struggle. It is impossible to overcome if it represents a rejection of the very ideals of the struggle, because it perceives that ideal as opposed to the most intimate wishes and feelings of the masses.

It is the latter case which may be observed, to a greater or lesser extent, in all Muslim countries where modernists attempt to implement their programmes. They flatter and threaten, plead and goad, organize and reorganize, change names and personalities, but run up against the stubborn rejection and indifference of ordinary people, who make up the majority of the nation. Habib Bourgiba - mentioned here simply as being representative of a widespread tendency - wears European clothes, speaks French at home, isolates Tunisia not only from the Islamic but also from the Arab world, restricts religious training, calls for the abolition of the Ramadan fast "as fasting reduces productivity", while he himself drinks orange juice in public in order to set a suitable example. After all this, he wonders at the passivity and lack of support on the part of the Tunisian masses for his "learned" reforms.

Modernists would not be what they are if they did not demonstrate this type of blindness.

The Muslim peoples will never accept anything which is expressly opposed to Islam, because Islam is not just a collection of ideas and laws but has transcended into love and feeling. He who rises up against Islam will reap nothing but hatred and resistance.

By their acts, modernists have created a state of internal conflict and confusion in which any programme - Islamic or foreign - becomes impracticable. The masses want Islamic action, but cannot carry it through without the intelligentsia. An alienated intelligentsia imposes a programme, but cannot find enough people prepared to contribute blood, sweat and enthusiasm for this paper ideal. The opposing forces cancel each other out and a stage of powerlessness and paralysis sets in.

There is an order, a dynamic, a prosperity, a progress which could be brought about on this ground and in this part of the world, but this is not the order, progress or prosperity of Europe or America. The indifference of the Muslim masses is not indifference at all. It is the way in which folk-Islam defends itself against outside, alien assault. Wherever there was the least prospect of an Islamic struggle, the ordinary man proved his readiness to fight, suffer and die. This was the example given by Turkey in the liberation struggle against Greece, following defeat in World War I, the heroic resistance in Libya against Italian occupation, and the recent examples of struggle against the

British in Suez, the war for the liberation of Algeria, for the retention of Indonesia and for Islamic influence in Pakistan. Wherever the masses had to be aroused, Islamic slogans were used, however temporarily and insincerely. Where there is Islam, there is no indifference.

The manifest feelings of the Muslim masses need an idea which would move and direct them, but this cannot be just any idea. It must be one which corresponds to their deepest feelings. It can only, therefore, be an Islamic idea.

There is no chance that the Muslim masses and their present intellectual and political leadership could agree on someone among them renouncing his ideal, regardless of how long this state of expectation and indecision may last. There is only one possible way out: the formation and grouping of a new intelligentsia which thinks and feels Islam. This intelligentsia would then fly the flag of the Islamic order and, together with the Muslim masses, take action to bring it about.

II

THE ISLAMIC ORDER

RELIGION AND THE LAW

The Islamic order: what does this mean, translated into the language thought, spoken and felt by our generation?

The briefest definition of the Islamic order defines it as a unity of religion and law, upbringing and power, ideal and interest, the spiritual community and the state, willingness and force.

As a synthesis of these components, the Islamic order posits two fundamental assumptions: an Islamic society and Islamic governance. The first is the matter and the second the form of the Islamic order. An Islamic society without an Islamic authority is incomplete and without power; Islamic governance without an Islamic society is either utopia or violence.

Generally speaking, a Muslim does not exist as a sole individual. If he wishes to live and survive as a Muslim, he must create an environment, a community, a system. He must change the world or himself submit to change. History has no instance of any truly Islamic movement which was not at the same time a political movement. This is because Islam is a religion, but it is at the same time a philosophy, a moral system, an order, a style, an atmosphere - in a word, an integrated way of life. One cannot believe in Islam and act, do business, enjoy one's leisure or rule

in a non-Islamic way. This state of discordance creates hypocrisy (praising God in the mosque, betraying Him outside it), or unhappy people full of conflict (unable either to break with the Qu'ran or to find the strength to fight and change the circumstances in which they live), or a monk-like, eccentric type of individual (who withdraws from the world because the world is not Islamic), or, ultimately, those who in their dilemma break with Islam and accept life and the world as find them, or rather, as others have made them.

The Islamic order is a society freed of this conflict, a framework of relations in which the Muslim finds himself in complete harmony with his surroundings.

To the question: what is a Muslim society? we would say it is a community composed of Muslims, and we think that this says it all, or almost all.

The meaning of this definition is that there is no system of institutions, relationships and laws disparate from the people who are its object of which it could be said: this is an Islamic system. No system is Islamic or non-Islamic of itself. It is only so because of the people who compose it.

A European believes that society is ordered by the rule of laws. Since Plato's "Republic", and the various utopian idea which followed up to the most recent - Marxism - the European spirit has been searching for one scheme, one pattern, which, by simply altering the relationships between people or groups, would give birth to the ideal society.

In the Qu'ran, on the other hand, there are relatively few real laws, and much more religion, and requirement for practical action in keeping with this religion.

A multiplicity of laws and a complex legislature is usually a sure sign that something is rotten in a society and that it should stop passing laws and start educating people. When the rottenness of the environment surpasses a certain point, the law becomes impotent. It then falls either into the hands of corrupt executors of justice, or becomes the subject of open or concealed trickery on the part of a corrupt environment.

Wine, gambling and sorcery - once widespread and deeply rooted vices throughout the entire Middle East - were eliminated for a lengthy period from an enormous region by a single Ayet of the Qu'ran, and by a single explanation: God had forbidden them. As soon as religion weakened, intoxication and superstition returned with unabated vigour, to which the incomparably higher level of culture by now obtaining offered no obstacle. America's Prohibition Law, proclaimed in the name of contemporary science and implemented with all the force of one of the most highly organized communities in the world, eventually had to be abandoned in the 'forties, after thirteen years of futile attempts, full of violence and crime. An attempt to introduce prohibition into Scandinavian countries ended in similar failure.

This and many similar examples clearly demonstrate that a society can be improved only in the name of God and by educating man. We should take the one road which surely leads to this

objective.

While in principle confirming the spiritual, interior approach in all of its manifestations, Islam, however, did not content itself with that. It endeavoured to tear the devil's weapon out of his hands. If, in what concerns man's relationship with the world, Islam did not start with man, it would not be a religion; if it were to remain at that, it would be simply a religion, merely repeating Jesus's teaching on the ideal and eternal aspect of man's being. Through Muhammad, (peace be upon him) and the Qu'ran, Islam addressed the real man, the outside world, nature, in order to evolve as a teaching on the complete man and on all aspects of life. Faith allied itself to the law, education and upbringing to power. Thus Islam became an order.

ISLAM IS NOT JUST A RELIGION

In this particular, which marks an indisputable turning point in the evolution of religious teaching, Islam differs from all other religions, doctrines and philosophies. It provides a new point of observation and a special approach, reflecting its entirely original philosophy. The lynchpin of this philosophy is the requirement that man must simultaneously live an interior and exterior, moral and social, spiritual and physical life, or more precisely, that he must willingly and in full awareness accept both these aspects of life as the human definition and meaning of his life on earth (Qu'ran 28/77). Translating this requirement into the language of everyday life, we could say: he who believes

that life should be ordered not only by faith and prayer, but by work and knowledge, whose vision of the world not only allows but demands that temple and factory stand side by side, who considers that people should not only be fed and educated, but that their life on earth should be facilitated and promoted, and that there is no reason to sacrifice either of these objectives to the other - this man belongs to Islam.

This, together with faith in God, is the main message of the Qu'ran, and in it is all of Islam. All else is mere development and explanation. This aspect of Islam, besides containing the principle of the Islamic order, the conjunction of religion and politics, leads to other significant conclusions of enormous fundamental and practical importance.

First and foremost of these conclusions is certainly the incompatibility of Islam with non-Islamic systems. There can be neither peace nor coexistence between the Islamic religion and non-Islamic social and political institutions. The failure of these institutions to function and the instability of the regimes in Muslim countries, manifest in frequent change and *coups d'etat*, is most often the consequence of their *a priori* opposition to Islam, as the fundamental and foremost feeling of the peoples in these countries. By claiming the right to order its own world itself, Islam obviously excludes the right or possibility of action on the part of any foreign ideology on that terrain. There is, therefore, no lay principle, and the state should both reflect and support religious moral concepts.

Every age and every generation has the task of implementing the message of Islam in new forms and by new means.

There are immutable Islamic principles which order relations between people. but there is no Islamic economic, social or political structure which cannot be changed.

This is only the first and most important conclusion in approaching Islam as an integrated order. The remaining three, equally important but less preclusive, are:

First: by opting for this world, Islam has opted for the best possible ordering of that world. Nothing which can make the world a better place may be rejected out of hand as non-Islamic;

Second: to be open to nature means to be open to learning. In order to be Islamic, any solution must fulfil two conditions: it must be maximally efficient and maximally humane. It must therefore reflect the reconciliation of religion and science in its highest form;

Third: by pointing to one link between religion and learning, morals and policy, the individual and the collective, the spiritual and the material - questions which divide the contemporary world - Islam regains its role as the intermediary of ideas, and the Islamic world as intermediary among nations in a divided world. By promising "religion without mysticism and learning without atheism", Islam can interest all people, no matter who they are.

THE ISLAMIC ORDER IN OUR DAY - ARGUMENTS

There are immutable Islamic principles which define the relationship between man and man, and between man and the community, but there are no fixed Islamic economic, social or political structures which have been handed down once and for all. Islamic sources contain no description of such a system. The way in which Muslims will carry on an economy, organize society and rule in the future will therefore differ from the way in which they carried on an economy, organized society or ruled in the past. Every age and each generation has the task of finding new ways and means of implementing the basic messages of Islam, which are unchanging and eternal, in a world which is not eternal and subject to constant change.

Our generation must accept that risk and make the attempt.

Aware of the inevitable imperfection of definitions of this kind, and restricting ourselves to principles which at this moment seem to be of greater importance, I present them here in the following order:

1.

(MAN AND THE COMMUNITY)

Islamic society is an organized community of believers. There is no purely scientific, revolutionary, socialist or other solely external salvation for man and society. Any salvation which does not imply a turning towards the interior life, the reshaping of man, his spiritual rebirth - impossible without God - is fallacious.

An Islamic society cannot be founded simply on social or economic interest, nor on any other external, technical basis. As a community of believers, its nucleus contains a religious and emotional factor of belonging. This element may be most clearly seen in the *Jam'aa*,* as the fundament of Islamic society.

In contrast to a society, as an abstract community with external relationships among its members, the *Jama'a* is an internal, tangible community, founded on spiritual membership, where contact between people is maintained by direct, personal acquaintance. This is man to man, not an anonymous member of society towards another equally anonymous member of the same society. As a means of recognition among people and of bringing them closer together, the *Jama'a* contributes to the solidarity and internal harmony of society, while helping to free the spirit of the loneliness and alienation resulting from technology and growing urbanization.

Besides this, the *Jama'a* creates a kind of public opinion which acts without the use of force, but nonetheless efficiently, against potential violators of social and moral norms. In the *Jama'a*, no one is alone, and this is so in a double sense: he is not alone to do whatever he likes, nor is he alone, left to himself to find his own moral and material support. If one Muslim does not feel the closeness of others, that Muslim society has failed.

**Jama'a*: Muslims, the Muslim society (translator's note)

Islam wants man to offer his hand to man, naturally and sincerely. Until this is accomplished, nothing has really been achieved. Islam does not agree to the perpetuation of a situation in which the state must intervene by force to defend people from one another. This is a situation which Islam may accept only conditionally and temporarily. Force and the law are only the tools of justice. Justice itself is to be found in the human heart, or it does not exist.

2.

(EQUALITY OF PEOPLE)

Two facts of major importance - the oneness of the Deity and the equality of man - have been laid down so clearly and explicitly by the Qu'ran, that they allow of only a single, literal interpretation: there is no god but the One God; there is no chosen people, race, or class - all people are equal.

Islam cannot accept the division and grouping of people according to external, objective measures such as class. As a religious and moral movement, it finds unacceptable any differentiation between people which does not include moral criteria. People must be distinguished - if they are indeed different - primarily by what they really are, which means by their spiritual and ethical value (Qu'ran, Surah 49/13). All just people, regardless of how they earn their bread by day, belong to the same community, just as blackguards and wrongdoers of all kinds belong to the same "class", regardless of their political affinities or place in the work process.

Class distinction is equally unjust, morally and humanly unacceptable, as national and other division and differentiation among people.

3.

(THE BROTHERHOOD OF MUSLIMS)

"Muslims are brethren" (Qu'ran, 49/10). In this message, the Qu'ran points to the goal, which because of its distance, provides a source of inspiration for a constant surge forwards. Enormous changes must take place within people and without, in order to reduce the distance on the road to the brotherhood so proclaimed.

In this principle, we see both the authorization and obligation of the Islamic community to establish appropriate institutions and undertake specific measures, so that the relationship between Muslims and real life may assimilate an increasing number of the elements and features of brotherhood. The number and kind of measures, initiatives and laws, which a truly Islamic administration could introduce by referring to the principle of brotherhood of all Muslims, is practically unlimited.

I would mention here great differences in social standing, in property, with feudalism as the most drastic case. The relationship between the vassal and his feudal overlord is not a brotherly relationship, but one of subjugation and dependence. As such, it is in direct contradiction to the Qu'ran and this principle.

4.

(UNITY OF MUSLIMS)

Islam contains the principle of the *umma*, i.e. a tendency towards the unification of all Muslims in a single community - religious, cultural and political. Islam is not nationality, but it is the supranationality of this community.

All that divides people in this community, whether related to ideas (sects, *mazhab*, political parties etc.), or material (great differences in wealth, social standing etc.), is opposed to this principle of unity and as such must be restricted and eliminated.

Islam is the first, and pan-Islamism the second point which defines the boundary line between Islamic and non-Islamic tendencies in the Muslim world today. The more Islam orders a community's internal, and pan-Islamism its external relations, the more that community is Islamic. Islam is its ideology, and pan-Islamism its policy.

5.

(PROPERTY)

Although Islam recognizes private property, the new Islamic society will have to unequivocally declare that all major sources of social wealth, particularly natural resources, must be the property of the community and serve the welfare of all its members. Social supervision of sources of wealth is essential in order on the one hand to prevent the accumulation of unmerited wealth and individual power, and on the other to ensure a material

base for development programmes in various areas, which the community will undertake in keeping with the increasingly greater part played by an organized society. Although differently disposed and implemented, the participation of society in solving an ever greater number of common tasks is equally great in the USA, the Soviet Union or Sweden, which shows that this is not a question of ideological or political approach, but a necessity which springs from the life of human communities in the contemporary world.

Private property is subject to yet another restriction based on an explicit command of the Qu'ran - the need to use it for the common good (Qu'ran, 49/34). Islam, therefore, does not recognize private property as understood by Roman Law. In contrast, private property in Sharia Law has one privilege less (*ius abutendi* - the right to abuse) and one obligation more (that of using wealth for the common good). The practical consequences of this difference for a truly Islamic government are far-reaching. Based on this and the dictate of the Qu'ran cited above, all legal and practical measures may be taken against abuse or failure to use private property. The elimination of injustice, inequality and particularly luxury and extravagance in the midst of misery, as something which devastates the community and separates people, will become at one point the criterion for the survival of the Islamic order and a gauge of the real values of the ethical and social standpoints it represents.

(ZEKAT* AND INTEREST)

Of all socially-charged Islamic regulations, one commandment and one prohibition are specially significant: the commandment of Zekat and the prohibition on charging interest.

The Zekat evidences the established principle of mutual responsibility and concern people evince for the fate of another. Once proclaimed, this principle can become the basis for new and various forms of solicitude in keeping with society's rate of development, its needs and contingencies.

In the Muslim world today, the Zekat is the private affair of each individual. In the present social and religious climate, it has ceased to function. Its absence is evident at every turn. In the Islamic order, the Zekat is an institution of public law, whose functioning must be guaranteed by all available means, including the use of force.

By forbidding the charging of interest (Qu'ran, 278/279), an invariable norm of the Islamic order was established, involving the banning of any income from annuities and of parasitic lifestyles, i.e. the achievement of wealth purely on the basis of land as contradictory to the moral basis on which the Islamic public order rests.

*Zekat: poor-rate (translator's note)

7.

(THE REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLE)

Apart from affairs of property, Islam does not recognize any principle of inheritance, nor any power with absolute prerogative. To recognize the absolute power of Allah means an absolute denial of any other almighty power (Qu'ran, 7/3, 12/40). "Any submission of a creature which includes a lack of submission to the Creator is forbidden" (Muhammad, peace be upon him). In the history of the first, and perhaps so far the only authentic Islamic order - at the time of the first four Caliphs - three key aspects of the republican principle of government may be seen: (1) an elective head of state, (2) the responsibility of the head of state towards the people and (3) the obligation of both to work on public affairs and social matters. The latter is explicitly supported by the Qu'ran (3/159, 42/38). The first four rulers in Islamic history were neither kings or emperors. They were chosen by the people. The inherited caliphate was an abandonment of the electoral principle, a clearly defined Islamic political institution.

8.

(THERE IS NO GOD BUT THE ONE GOD)

Insofar as we consider the establishment of an Islamic order an incontrovertible and invincible aim, the more assuredly do we reject the immunity of public personalities, regardless of their